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TiDB Cloud customers should replace their management API keys now. PingCAP reported on 19 October 2026 that someone used stolen service-account credentials to reach internal systems between 9 September and 7 October, copied data and took source code. Organization owners create new keys, update each integration, then delete the old keys. Watch for targeted phishing.
| Fact | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| What happened | Stolen service-account credentials used to access some internal systems, copy data and obtain source code | PingCAP report |
| Window | 9 September to 7 October 2026; PingCAP became aware on 7 October and began disabling credentials that day | PingCAP report |
| Customer databases | PingCAP says there is no evidence that data stored in TiDB was impacted | PingCAP report |
| Exported records | Names, emails, organization and project links, SQL editor text and errors, some project and cluster identifiers, contacts, contract terms, orders, pricing, payment terms, billing configuration, and encrypted API-key values | PingCAP report |
| Your action | Owners replace active management API keys, then delete the old ones | PingCAP customer actions |
| Exploitation status | PingCAP says the exported API-key values were encrypted and it had not found evidence that any were decrypted or used | PingCAP customer actions |
| Checked | 2 November 2026, against PingCAP's own pages. Neither page has changed since 19 and 20 October | this page |
Who is affected by the TiDB Cloud breach?
PingCAP says not every customer had every category of data exposed. At its 19 October report it was still working out which customers and which data types were involved, and it says it will notify affected customers directly once customer-specific impact is established. No public customer list exists at our check on 2 November 2026, and we name none.
A working rule for owners: if your organization has a TiDB Cloud account, treat your contact details, billing details and any SQL typed into the editor as possibly in scope. Treat your management API keys as the thing to replace.
What is confirmed, and what is not?
PingCAP's 19 October report is the primary source here, with the 20 October customer-actions notice for rotation and phishing guidance. The report says an outside response firm found no evidence that the attacker ran commands or kept access in the production systems it reviewed. It also says an exported table held encrypted API-key values, and that one test value from the investigators could not be used directly as an API key. Whether other usable credentials were exposed was still open on 19 October.
Two things PingCAP lists as still open: whether the attacker's claims about credentials in support materials are accurate, and whether four vulnerabilities reported by the outside firm on 12 and 13 October were used before PingCAP fixed them. PingCAP's report says all four were fixed by 14 October. PingCAP says it is checking production logs, and at our 2 November 2026 check it had published no result for either question.
How do I rotate my TiDB Cloud keys?
PingCAP's customer guidance says only organization owners can create or delete API keys, and it separates two cases.
What if I see no sign of misuse?
- Switch to each organization you own, then open Organization Settings, then API Keys, and create a replacement key. Save the private key straight away, it is shown once.
- Replace the old key in every application, script and automation that uses it. Confirm each one works.
- Delete the old key.
- List every key in each organization and delete any you no longer use.
- Review the logs you have for activity you do not recognise.
What if I suspect a key was misused?
Revoke it first, even if an integration breaks for a while, and do not create a replacement beforehand. Then write to security@pingcap.com. PingCAP asks that you leave passwords, tokens and private keys out of the email.
What does PingCAP not tell me, and what do we suggest?
PingCAP's guidance has no advice on SQL editor content or database passwords. Its report lists SQL editor text and errors among exported records. This part is our judgment, not PingCAP's: if anyone on your team ever pasted a password, token or connection string into the TiDB Cloud SQL editor, rotate that secret too. A support question you can send:
For our TiDB Cloud organization [name or ID], were any of our records in the data exported between 9 September and 7 October 2026? If so, which categories (SQL editor text, API-key values, billing details), and do you recommend rotating anything beyond management API keys?
Am I affected? A three-state self-test
Am I affected? Where you stand right now
A scan of your website cannot tell you whether a vendor held your data. Only PingCAP can say what was exported for your account.
- Detected PingCAP has told you directly that your organization's data was in the export, or you see API or console activity you did not make. Contact security@pingcap.com and rotate anything pasted into the SQL editor. If you see activity you did not make, revoke the affected key first, even if an integration breaks. If you only have the notice, create replacement keys, update and verify your integrations, then delete the old ones.
- Unknown You use TiDB Cloud and have had no notice. This is the common case, and PingCAP was still mapping customers on 19 October. Rotate management API keys now and ask the question above.
- Confirmed by owner evidence You hold a written reply from PingCAP about your organization, plus dated records that every old key was deleted and every integration works on the new one. Key rotation is done. Keep watching for phishing.
No scan, ours included, moves you from "unknown" to "confirmed".
What phishing should I expect?
PingCAP warns that exposed business details could support targeted phishing. Its guidance: be careful with requests for passwords, verification codes, payment or billing changes and urgent account actions, even when they quote accurate details about your organization. Verify through a channel you already trust, and do not reply to the message or use contact details inside it.
Does this affect my website?
Not directly. This is a vendor-side intrusion, so there is nothing to patch on your server. The exposure that can follow is a leaked key used from outside. If your application calls the TiDB Cloud management API or keeps a key in a shipped bundle, a .env file or a public repository, that key is worth finding. Red's free scan checks for API keys and tokens in shipped bundles and for exposed .env and .git files. It reads what your site serves, so it cannot see keys stored in CI or in a secret manager. If you want to test for a published file yourself, how to check whether your .env is public takes a few minutes, and what an exposed env file costs shows the order to rotate in.
Another vendor told users to replace their keys in October: Railway's rotate-everything notice. A compromised package on the build side is covered in the LiteLLM 1.107.0 write-up, and the other incident write-ups are collected on the topic page. Other October incidents, each with a different fix, are lined up in one running list of October breaches. For a short to-do list, see the October 2026 checklist.
Questions people ask
Was TiDB Cloud hacked?
PingCAP says an unauthorized party used stolen service-account credentials to reach some of its internal systems between 9 September and 7 October 2026, copied data and obtained source code. PingCAP also says it has no evidence that data stored in customer TiDB databases was impacted. Those are the company's own statements, as of its 19 October report.
Am I affected by the TiDB Cloud breach?
PingCAP had not finished mapping the exported data to customers at its 19 October report and says it will notify affected customers directly. If you have a TiDB Cloud account, assume your name and email were in scope until PingCAP tells you otherwise. Email security@pingcap.com with questions and do not put secrets in the message.
What should I rotate after the TiDB Cloud breach?
PingCAP recommends that organization owners replace active TiDB Cloud management API keys now, as a precaution. Create the new key, update every integration, confirm each works, then delete the old key. If you suspect misuse, revoke the key first and contact PingCAP.
Do I need to change my database passwords?
PingCAP's customer guidance gives no database password advice. It says it has no evidence that data stored in customer TiDB databases was impacted. Whether to rotate is your call; the cheap, low-risk case for it is any credential that was ever typed into the SQL editor, because PingCAP lists SQL editor text among the exported records.
How many API keys or terabytes were stolen?
No figure is confirmed. PingCAP's report states that the attacker's claims about credentials in support materials have not been verified. The report gives no data-volume or API-key count, and this page cites none.
Sources
- PingCAP: Security Update, October 2026 Security Incident Report (published 19 October 2026)The timeline, the exported data categories, what PingCAP says it has no evidence of, and what is still open. No update after 19 October at our read on 2 November 2026.
- PingCAP: Recommended Customer Actions, October 2026 Security Incident (published 20 October 2026)The API-key rotation steps and the phishing guidance. No update after 20 October at our read on 2 November 2026.
Facts on this page are dated and point at the primary source next to them. If a vendor status changes after the date shown, the vendor's page wins; tell us at support@run.cloud and we will update it.