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If you installed the OVHcloud CLI (ovhcloud-cli) and ran a binary from v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 downloaded on 19 October 2026 between 14:47 and 16:21 (UTC+2), assume the secrets on that machine are stolen. Delete the binary, update to v0.16.0, and rotate every credential that machine could read. OVHcloud publishes the details in its own advisory.
| Fact | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Product | ovhcloud-cli, OVHcloud's command line client, GitHub releases | OVHcloud advisory |
| Affected | v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 binaries, downloaded and run in the window | Advisory |
| Window | 14:47 to 16:21 (UTC+2) on 19 October 2026, which the advisory puts at 1 hour 33 minutes; about 250 downloads | Advisory |
| Platforms | Darwin (arm64, x86_64), Linux (arm64, x86_64), Windows (x86_64) | Advisory |
| Unaffected | v0.16.0, released 19:16 (UTC+2) with a signed tag | Advisory |
| Identifier | No CVE id; GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw, severity High | Advisory |
| Published | 20 October 2026 | Advisory |
| Checked | 4 November 2026 | this page |
This is a supply chain incident, not a flaw in OVHcloud's hosting or its customer sites. It belongs with the other cases in the October 2026 tracker, and it fits the pattern described in open-source single points of failure.
What happened to the OVHcloud CLI releases?
According to OVHcloud's advisory, a developer's personal GitHub account had been compromised a year earlier, on 20 October 2025, through a malicious VS Code extension. On 19 October the attacker used that access to replace existing release assets with recompiled binaries that carried stealer code. The advisory says the source code and build chain were not affected, only the released assets.
The file names and version numbers stayed the same. Anyone who fetched an affected version in the window got the replaced file from the real project page. That is why the usual instinct, "I downloaded it from the official repository", did not help.
All times below are UTC+2, as the advisory gives them. 14:47 in UTC+2 is 12:47 UTC.
| Time (UTC+2) | Event in the advisory |
|---|---|
| 14:47 | Darwin binary of v0.15.0 replaced |
| 14:57 | All v0.15.0 binaries replaced |
| 15:30 | v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 all replaced |
| 15:50 | A customer reports suspicious activity |
| 15:57 | Investigation begins |
| 16:21 | Malicious binaries removed |
| 18:52 | Public announcement on X |
| 19:16 | Clean v0.16.0 released with a signed tag |
Was my machine affected?
Only copies downloaded and executed in the window were affected, according to the advisory. The README lists four ways to install: an install script, a binary download, a Homebrew cask and go install. The advisory does not break the incident down by install method, so we cannot say which of those paths delivered a replaced file. Do not assume your method was safe or unsafe.
Checks that need no special tools:
- Find the download time of your copy: browser history, shell history, the file's creation time, or the CI job log that installed it.
- Check the version:
ovhcloud version. Do this only if you have not already run the binary, since running it is what the malware needs. - Look in the temporary directory for folders named
envcheckerfollowed by a 9 or 10 digit number. The advisory says the malware never deleted them. - Compare the binary's hash against the appendix of the advisory. OVHcloud tells readers to verify the hashes without running the binary.
- List every CI runner, container image and laptop that installed the CLI on 19 October.
Am I affected? Where you stand right now
A scan of your website cannot see a developer laptop or a CI runner. Only you, or whoever manages that machine, can settle this.
- Detected A v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 binary was downloaded in the window, an
envcheckerfolder exists, or the hash matches the advisory list. Treat every secret on that machine as stolen and rotate now. - Unknown You use the CLI but cannot say when your copy arrived, or a CI cache or image holds it. This is the common case. Find the install time. If you cannot, rotate the credentials that machine could read.
- Confirmed by owner evidence A log, history entry or file timestamp puts your download outside the window, or you installed v0.16.0 or later. The advisory describes only the window as affected. Keep the evidence with your records.
No scan, ours included, moves you from "unknown" to "confirmed".
What did the malware take?
The advisory lists the files and credential stores the stealer looked for. Reading it, the targets were broader than the CLI itself:
- Editors and coding assistants: VS Code, Cursor, Continue, Sourcegraph Cody, OpenCode, Hermes and Claude agent configuration.
- Cloud accounts: AWS, Google Cloud and Azure credentials.
- Containers and orchestration: Docker and Kubernetes config.
- Package and platform tokens: npm and DigitalOcean doctl.
- Infrastructure and access: Terraform, SSH keys, Git config and
.netrc.
The advisory says stolen data was gathered in temporary folders and sent out through Solana RPC calls to an IP-based upload server. It publishes the wallet, IP and hash values for defenders. We do not repeat them here, because the advisory is the place to take them from and it may be updated.
OVHcloud's recommendation is plain: assume the secrets on that computer are compromised, rotate the credentials across the targeted services, delete the malicious binaries, and update to v0.16.0 or later. The order of operations is in the rotate secrets after a breach guide.
What should I rotate, and in what order?
| Where it lived on the machine | Rotate | Then check |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud credential files and environment variables | Access keys, then session tokens | Cloud audit logs for use since 19 October |
| SSH keys | Generate new keys, remove the old public keys from servers and Git hosts | Authorized keys on every server |
Git credentials and .netrc | Personal access tokens, deploy keys | Repository access and recent pushes |
| Docker and Kubernetes config | Registry tokens, cluster credentials | Image pushes, new workloads |
| npm, doctl and other CLI tokens | Revoke and reissue | Recent publishes and API activity |
| Editor and AI assistant keys | Revoke provider API keys | Provider usage and billing |
| Website hosting, DNS, database and deploy secrets stored locally | Reissue each | Changes to DNS, files and admin users |
Rotate from a clean machine. A key changed on the infected computer can be copied again.
Why were checksums not enough?
A checksum answers one question: does this file match this number? It does not say who made the file. If the number sits beside the file, in the same release, behind the same account, then whoever can change one can usually change the other. The advisory does not say whether a checksum file was altered in this incident, so we make no claim about it. The point holds either way: a match is only as trustworthy as the place the expected number came from.
Notice what the advisory itself asks readers to do. It points to a list of the bad hashes and asks you to compare. That works as a denylist after the fact. It cannot tell you a new file is genuine on the day you download it.
| Check | What a pass proves | What it cannot prove |
|---|---|---|
| Checksum file in the same release | The file matches that file | That the publisher, not an intruder, wrote either |
| Hash pinned somewhere else, such as a Homebrew cask | The download matches what that pinned hash described | That the pinned hash was reviewed against a trusted build |
| Immutable release | Tag and assets are locked after publish; a release attestation records tag, commit and assets | Anything about a release published before it was enabled, or that the contents are benign |
Build provenance, checked with gh attestation verify | The file came from a named repository and workflow | That the code in that workflow is free of malice. GitHub says attestations are not a guarantee that an artifact is secure |
| Signature checked against an expected identity (cosign) | The signer is the identity and issuer you named | That the named identity itself is uncompromised |
The advisory says the repository was not configured for release immutability and that OVHcloud has since turned on immutable releases across the organisation. GitHub's documentation says immutability applies to future releases only, so it protects new releases and does not retroactively protect old ones.
How do I verify a release before I run it?
Prefer an attestation or a signature over a checksum, and decide in advance who you expect the signer to be. What signed packages actually prove is worth knowing before you lean on either. SLSA puts the burden on the consumer: you need to know what the correct provenance looks like and compare it with what you get.
If a project publishes GitHub release attestations, gh release verify-asset checks that a downloaded file's digest matches the attestation and that the attestation belongs to the release. gh attestation verify lets you pin the repository and the signing workflow. Use whichever the project actually publishes, and read its docs first.
Then reduce what a bad binary can reach:
- Pin the version in CI and review upgrades. A tag that moves is a warning sign.
- Do not give build and deploy machines long-lived cloud keys. Use short-lived credentials where the platform offers them.
- Keep production secrets off laptops that install many tools.
- Treat the first few hours after a release as the riskiest. A short delay before adopting a new version costs little.
- Ask the vendor the question below if the project offers no signature at all.
Do you publish signatures or build attestations for your release binaries, which identity should I expect as the signer, and how can I verify a release without trusting the file's own download page?
What does this mean if I only run a website?
The CLI itself does not run on your website. The exposure is the credentials its host machine held. A site owner, agency or freelancer who managed OVHcloud services from a laptop or a CI job with the CLI installed should read the rotation table above, especially for hosting, DNS, database and deploy keys.
If you rotate a secret that your site also ships to the browser, check that it did not leak twice. The free scan reads the stack your site serves and looks for API keys and tokens in shipped bundles and for exposed .env and .git files. It is a lookup from outside, so it says nothing about what is on a developer machine. Related incidents with the same shape are the GhostAction workflows and the npm worm. For how to prove a fix rather than assume it, see a way to confirm the fix actually worked. If you are unsure whether a build-time compromise reached your live pages, the build versus runtime question is answered on its own page, and the other supply chain guides cover the rest.
Questions people ask
Is my OVHcloud CLI compromised?
Only if you downloaded and ran a v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 binary between 14:47 and 16:21 (UTC+2) on 19 October 2026. Version 0.16.0 is described as unaffected. If you cannot say when your copy was downloaded, treat it as unknown and rotate.
How do I know if the malware ran on my machine?
The advisory says the malware left temporary folders named envchecker followed by a 9 or 10 digit number, and that they were never deleted. Look for them, and compare your binary's hash with the list in the advisory appendix without running it. Absence of the folder is a good sign, not proof.
Which passwords and keys do I rotate?
Everything on the machine that ran the binary. The advisory says to assume secrets on that computer are compromised. It names cloud credentials, SSH keys, container and Kubernetes config, package manager tokens and tokens of editor and AI coding tools.
I verified the checksum and it matched. Why was that not enough?
A checksum only says the file matches a number. If the number is published in the same place the attacker could write to, a match proves nothing about who made the file. Use a signature or build attestation checked against an identity you expect.
Does this affect my website?
Not directly. The CLI runs on a developer or CI machine. The risk to a website is the credentials stored there, such as hosting, DNS, database and deploy keys. If any of those were on an affected machine, rotate them.
Sources
- GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw: ovhcloud-cli security incident, October 19th, 2026 (OVHcloud, GitHub advisory)The primary source for the window, affected versions, targets, root cause and recommendations. Published 20 October 2026, unchanged at our 4 November 2026 check.
- ovh/ovhcloud-cli security advisories list (GitHub)One published advisory at our check on 4 November 2026. No CVE id is assigned in the advisory.
- ovh/ovhcloud-cli releases (GitHub)Shows v0.16.0 as the latest release at our check on 4 November 2026.
- ovh/ovhcloud-cli README: installation methodsLists install script, binary download, Homebrew cask and go install. Carried no incident notice at our check.
- ovh/ovhcloud-cli SECURITY.mdScope covers release artifacts on GitHub and Docker Hub; only the latest release receives security fixes.
- GitHub Docs: immutable releasesWhat is locked after publish and what a release attestation records.
- GitHub Docs: enabling immutable releasesImmutability applies to future releases only.
- GitHub CLI manual: gh release verify-assetChecks a downloaded file against the release attestation.
- GitHub CLI manual: gh attestation verifyVerifies build provenance; --repo and --signer-workflow pin who may have built the file.
- GitHub Docs: artifact attestationsStates attestations are not a guarantee that an artifact is secure.
- SLSA v1.0 build levelsConsumers must compare actual provenance with what they expect.
- Sigstore cosign: verifying signed artifactsKeyless verification needs the expected signer identity and issuer.
- Homebrew Cask Cookbook: sha256 stanzaA cask pins the SHA-256 of the file it downloads.
Facts on this page are dated and point at the primary source next to them. If a vendor status changes after the date shown, the vendor's page wins; tell us at support@run.cloud and we will update it.