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Brevo script compromise: were your visitors served ClickFix?

Brevo scripts on customer sites were altered for about 4.5 hours on 14 Sep 2026 to show ClickFix prompts. Check if you embed them and if an admin visit added a plugin.

By Timothy Lindblom, FounderPublished 2 November 20268 min readHow we check facts
On this page
  1. Did the Brevo attack touch my website?
  2. How do I check if I embed Brevo?
  3. What window do I need to look at in my own time zone?
  4. What did visitors see, and what should they do?
  5. Was a plugin installed on my WordPress site?
  6. Which of my findings means what?
  7. Am I affected? A three-state self-test
  8. Is it still risky now?
  9. Would a content security policy or integrity hash have helped?
  10. What to ask your agency or whoever manages the site

If your site embeds a Brevo form, chat widget or tracking script, visitors could have been shown a fake verification prompt between about 16:05 and 20:30 UTC on 14 September 2026. If a WordPress admin was logged in during that window, a plugin may also have been installed. Check your page source for Brevo scripts, then your plugin folders and logs for that date.

FactDetailSource
What happenedAn attacker used a long-lived Cloudflare API key to rewrite Brevo scripts at the edge. Visitors were shown a fake Cloudflare verification page with instructions to run a pasted command on WindowsBrevo write-up
Window on 14 Sep 2026Brevo's own pages from 15:01 UTC. The embedded customer scripts from 16:07 to 20:30 UTC (Brevo). 16:05:18 to 20:12:53 UTC (Sansec's own observation)Brevo, Sansec
Altered filescdn.brevo.com/js/sdk-loader.js, conversations-widget.brevo.com/brevo-conversations.js, the forms script on sibforms.comBrevo, Sansec
WordPress angleWhen the script saw a logged-in administrator it tried to install and activate a plugin from cdn10.sendibt1.com/p/wm.zipSansec
Not affected, per Brevoapp.brevo.com, the API, email sending, customer account dataBrevo
ScaleSansec estimates up to 100,000 sites embed the affected components. That is an estimate of exposure, not a count of compromised sitesSansec
StatusBrevo marked the incident resolved on 15 Sep 2026Brevo status
Checked2 November 2026this page
14 Sep2026, the only day of injection (Brevo)
\~4.5 hexposure window (Brevo, BleepingComputer)
100ksites that may embed the scripts (Sansec estimate)

Did the Brevo attack touch my website?

Only if a page of yours loaded a Brevo-hosted script during the window. That covers the sign-up form from the Brevo plugin or an embed code, the Conversations chat widget, and the SDK loader that the tracker and some forms use. The Brevo plugin on WordPress.org lists forms, a tracking script, web push and chat among its features, and showed 100,000+ active installs at our 24 October check.

Brevo's write-up says the attacker changed responses at the edge. The files on your own server were never modified, which is why a file integrity scan of your site finds nothing from this part of the incident. Brevo says no systems were modified at the source and the content was altered in transit at its CDN edge, as BleepingComputer also reports.

The attack did not need your site to be vulnerable. A fully updated site that embedded the script was in scope.

How do I check if I embed Brevo?

Open your site in a browser, view the page source, and search for these names. Do it on a template page, a page with a form, and the checkout or contact page, because a script can be loaded on some pages only.

  • sibforms.com, the hosted form and its script
  • cdn.brevo.com, where the SDK loader lived
  • conversations-widget.brevo.com, the chat widget
  • sendinblue.com, the older brand name still found in old embeds

The files these hosts serve now are not the files that were served on 14 September, so seeing normal behaviour today says nothing about that afternoon. The only question the page source answers is whether you were in scope.

Also check what your agency or a previous developer added. Marketing embeds are often added once and forgotten, so ask whoever built the site.

What window do I need to look at in my own time zone?

Brevo and Sansec measured slightly different edges, so use the wider range, 16:05 to 20:30 UTC on 14 September 2026. Server logs are usually in UTC or the server's local time.

Where you areLocal time on 14 Sep 2026
UTC / GMT16:05 to 20:30
London (BST, UTC+1)17:05 to 21:30
Central Europe (CEST, UTC+2)18:05 to 22:30
New York (EDT, UTC-4)12:05 to 16:30
Los Angeles (PDT, UTC-7)09:05 to 13:30
Sydney (AEST, UTC+10)02:05 to 06:30 on 15 Sep

Brevo's write-up also says the compromised key was first misused in late August, but that no malicious content was injected before 14 September.

Timeline of the Brevo ClickFix incident on 14 September 2026, in UTC Scripts altered: 16:05 to 20:30 15:01 brevo.com own pages hit 16:07 embedded scripts targeted 19:33 incident opened 20:30 Worker removed 14:00 UTC 21:00 UTC
The incident on 14 September 2026 in UTC, from Brevo's write-up. Sansec measured the edges of the window as 16:05:18 and 20:12:53.

What did visitors see, and what should they do?

According to Brevo, the altered script displayed a fake Cloudflare verification page that told the visitor to open the Windows Run box, paste, and press Enter. The pasted text was a command that downloaded malware onto the visitor's Windows computer. This technique is called ClickFix, and CISA and the FBI describe it as users being tricked into running a malicious command through a fake CAPTCHA.

Sansec reports the script avoided crawlers and automated scanners. That means a scan of your site from outside, ours included, would not have seen the prompt, and an absence of reports from search engines is not evidence either way.

Brevo's guidance for anyone who ran the command: treat that computer as compromised, disconnect it, run a full antivirus scan, and change the passwords used on it, starting with the Brevo password. You cannot tell from your side whether a visitor did this. If a similar prompt ever shows up on your own pages, removing a fake verify box is its own walkthrough.

Was a plugin installed on my WordPress site?

This is the part that stays after Brevo's fix. Both Brevo and Sansec say that when the script saw a logged-in WordPress administrator, it tried to install and activate a plugin. BleepingComputer reports it posed as "Web Media Optimizer", hid itself from the plugin list, copied itself into the must-use plugins directory, and held a hardcoded key that creates an administrator session without a password. Sansec says it did not recover the plugin, so those behaviours rest on BleepingComputer's report.

If an admin was logged in on your site and opened a page with a Brevo script during the window, check in this order:

  1. Access logs for 14 September. Sansec lists POST requests to /wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin and requests to /wp-admin/plugins.php?action=activate shortly after.
  2. Plugin install dates. Look for any plugin folder created on 14 September that you did not install.
  3. Disk against screen. Compare the folders in wp-content/plugins with what wp-admin lists. A plugin on disk and missing in the screen is a red flag.
  4. The must-use directory. WordPress shows must-use plugins in a separate list in wp-content/mu-plugins and they cannot be disabled from wp-admin. On the command line, wp plugin list --status=must-use (WP-CLI) prints them.
  5. Administrator accounts. wp user list --role=administrator (WP-CLI) shows the registration date of each admin. Any new admin you cannot explain needs the playbook, and finding and removing a hidden admin shows how.

If you find something, remove the plugin file first and change passwords afterwards. A password change does not remove a plugin that carries its own login key. The step-by-step guide to preserving evidence comes first, and the order to change keys and passwords comes after.

Which of my findings means what?

What you foundWhat it meansNext step
No Brevo script anywhere on your pagesYour visitors were not served the altered filesNone for this incident. Keep the page-source check in your notes
Brevo script embedded, no admin logged in during the windowVisitors could have been shown the prompt. Your site was not modifiedConsider a short notice. Change your Brevo password if you were signed in on 14 Sep
Brevo script embedded, admin logged in during the window, logs show no plugin upload or activate requestThe install was likely not attempted through your adminKeep the logs. Still check the must-use list
Plugin upload and activate requests on 14 Sep, or an unexplained plugin or adminTreat the site as compromisedRemove the plugin, review admins, follow the playbook
Brevo script embedded, no logs for that dateYou cannot show either wayCheck disk and admin lists now. Ask the host if they keep access logs

Am I affected? A three-state self-test

Am I affected? Where you stand right now

An outside check can read what your site serves today. It cannot see what was served on the afternoon of 14 September, and Sansec reports the script avoided scanners.

  1. Detected You find an unexplained plugin, a file in mu-plugins, a new administrator, or plugin upload and activate requests dated 14 September. Treat the site as compromised. Remove the plugin, review administrators, and follow the incident playbook.
  2. Unknown Your pages embed a Brevo script, and you have no access logs for the window or cannot say who was logged in. This is the common case. Check the disk and the administrator list now, and ask the host whether logs exist.
  3. Confirmed by owner evidence You hold logs covering 14 September with no plugin upload or activate requests, folders on disk that match what wp-admin shows, and an administrator list with nothing unexplained. That settles the WordPress question. It does not tell you what visitors were shown.

No scan, ours included, moves you from "unknown" to "confirmed". The free scan reads the stack your site serves and matches versions to known vulnerabilities. It is a lookup.

Is it still risky now?

Brevo reports that it revoked the key, removed the malicious Worker and routes, purged edge caches, and replaced the hardcoded credential with narrowly scoped, short-lived tokens. Sansec reports the attacker hosts, cdn.sendibt1.com through cdn11.sendibt1.com, stopped resolving on 15 September. At our check on 2 November 2026 Brevo's write-up showed the incident as resolved, with hardening ongoing, and no later update.

That ends the injection. It does not undo anything that already ran on your site or on a visitor's computer. A plugin installed on 14 September keeps running until someone removes it, which is why a month-old incident is still worth ten minutes today.

Would a content security policy or integrity hash have helped?

A host allow-list in your Content Security Policy would not have. MDN explains that a host-based policy allows whatever that host serves, so a changed script from an allowed host still runs. Brevo says the Worker rewrote responses at the edge and removed security headers such as Content-Security-Policy.

A Subresource Integrity hash makes the browser refuse a script whose content changed. It also refuses a script the vendor legitimately updates, so it suits files that are versioned and never edited in place. For vendor loaders that change often, the practical options are loading them only on pages that need them, and keeping a list of every third-party script your site loads. Pinning and provenance for what you depend on covers the same idea for packages.

What to ask your agency or whoever manages the site

Between 16:05 and 20:30 UTC on 14 September 2026, did any page on [domain] load a script from sibforms.com, brevo.com, sendinblue.com or conversations-widget.brevo.com? Please send the access logs for that date, the list of plugins in both the plugins and mu-plugins folders with install dates, and the current administrator list.

For the wider pattern of vendor-hosted scripts and keys, see the other incidents we have covered. The same trust problem exists when a plugin vendor holds a remote-control key to your site, and the other WordPress guides are collected on the WordPress topic page.

Questions people ask

Did the Brevo hack affect my website?

Only if your pages loaded a Brevo script, such as a sign-up form, the Conversations chat widget or the SDK loader, between about 16:05 and 20:30 UTC on 14 September 2026. If you never embedded any of those, your visitors were not served the altered files. If you did, check your logs for plugin installs that day.

How do I know if my WordPress site has the Web Media Optimizer plugin?

Look in wp-content/plugins and in wp-content/mu-plugins on the server, not only in the wp-admin Plugins screen. BleepingComputer reports that the plugin hides itself from the normal list and copies itself into the must-use directory. Compare the folders on disk with what wp-admin shows and remove anything you did not install.

I use Brevo forms. Do I need to change my Brevo password?

Brevo says that if you logged into brevo.com on 14 September 2026 you should change your password and review your API keys. Brevo says its app, API, email sending and account data were not affected, so this is a precaution for people who were signed in during the window.

Is it still risky to use Brevo scripts on my site?

Brevo says it removed the malicious Worker at 20:30 UTC on 14 September, revoked the key and replaced it with short-lived tokens. Sansec reports the attacker hosts stopped resolving on 15 September. The remaining risk is anything that was already planted on your own site, which Brevo's fix does not remove.

My admin was logged in on 14 September. What happened to my site?

Brevo and Sansec both say the injected script tried to install and activate a plugin when it detected a logged-in WordPress administrator. Whether it worked on your site depends on that admin's session and permissions. Your access logs for that date show requests to the plugin upload and activate pages if it did.

Do I have to tell my visitors or customers?

If your site embedded the affected scripts in the window, a short factual notice is reasonable: which hours, what the prompt looked like, and that anyone who pasted a command should treat that computer as compromised. Brevo gives the same advice for that case. Legal duties depend on where you operate.

Sources

  1. Brevo incident write-up: ClickFix (status.brevo.com)Brevo's own timeline, affected scripts, root cause and customer guidance. Dated 14 September 2026 on the page. Checked 2 November 2026.
  2. Brevo status page: Security Incident - ClickFixMarked resolved on 15 September 2026. Checked 24 October 2026.
  3. Sansec: Brevo supply chain attack (16 September 2026)Independent timeline, the plugin download host, log indicators for site owners, and the 100,000 site estimate. Checked 24 October 2026.
  4. BleepingComputer: Brevo supply-chain attack injected ClickFix scripts on customer sites (17 September 2026)Source for the Web Media Optimizer name and the must-use plugin persistence claim. Checked 24 October 2026.
  5. WordPress developer docs: must-use pluginsDirectory path, the separate Must-Use list, and why they cannot be disabled from wp-admin.
  6. WP-CLI: wp plugin listThe must-use status filter.
  7. WP-CLI: wp user listFilter by administrator role and show registration dates.
  8. MDN: Subresource IntegrityWhat an integrity hash does and why it conflicts with vendor scripts that change in place.
  9. MDN: Content Security PolicyWhy a host allow-list does not stop a changed script from an allowed host.
  10. CISA and FBI advisory AA25-203A (22 July 2025)Government description of the ClickFix technique: a fake CAPTCHA that tricks the visitor into running a command.
  11. Brevo for WordPress (WordPress.org plugin directory)Lists forms, tracker, web push and chat as plugin features. 100,000+ active installs at our 24 October 2026 check.

Facts on this page are dated and point at the primary source next to them. If a vendor status changes after the date shown, the vendor's page wins; tell us at support@run.cloud and we will update it.